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BREXIT AND UK ENERGY POLICY 
Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde Law School 
EU Energy Policy 
Despite the fact that two out of the three founding organisations of what is now the European Union 
(EU)  ? the European Coal and Steel Community (which expired in 2002) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom)  ? had energy at their heart, the EU did not acquire a general legal 
competence in energy policy until the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009.  What is now Article 194 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives the EU institutions shared competence 
with Member States ƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽ “(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure 
security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy 
networks.  However, Member State sovereignty over the exploitation of primary energy sources, their 
energy mix, and the general structure of their energy supply is expressly preserved. 
Nevertheless, well before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had begun to make significant inroads into 
DĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĞŶĞƌŐǇƉŽůŝĐǇĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŽĨƚĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ, relying on other 
policy bases.  From the early 1990s onwards, the European Commission sought to liberalise European 
gas and electricity markets, relying on general competition and free movement laws.  Three successive 
waves of liberalisation directives, in 1996/98, 20 ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇŽƉĞŶĞĚDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?
wholesale and retail energy markets to competition, and in February 2015, the EU launched its 
Framework Strategy for an Energy Union with the aim of creating a genuinely cross-border internal 
market in energy.  EU environmental policy, and latterly climate change policy, has also had a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĞŶĞƌŐǇ systems.  The promotion of low-carbon energy, along 
with transparent and integrated markets, affordability, and security of energy supply, is now a key 
objective of EU energy policy. 
UK and EU Energy Policy 
Since the 1980s, the UK has been in the vanguard of energy reform in Europe, both as regards the 
liberalisation of energy markets and subsequently in the transition to low-carbon energy systems.  In 
general, the UK has been a strong supporter, and influential driver, of EU energy policy.  EU law has 
therefore been a constraint upon, rather than a major determinant of UK energy policy, although more 
of the detail of UK energy regulation has been derived from EU law as the scope and ambition of EU 
energy policy has increased.   
Given the clear alignment between EU and UK energy goals, withdrawal from the EU is unlikely to 
change UK energy policy significantly.  In any case, other constraints  ? such as domestic and 
international climate change obligations, and the sharing of domestic energy policy competences 
between UK and devolved institutions - are likely to ensure considerable policy continuity.  Moreover, 
achievement of those policy goals makes ongoing integration with European energy markets highly 
desirable.  Nonetheless, loss of the external enforcement and accountability mechanisms provided by 
EU law means that Brexit will remove an important guarantor of energy policy stability.  Such stability 
is particularly important in the current low-carbon energy transition.  This requires enormous 
investment in energy infrastructure, which  ? given its long-term, capital-intensive, and  ‘ƐƵŶŬ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞ 
 ? is notoriously susceptible to political risk. 
Brexit and UK Energy Policy 
So far, the UK Government has given very limited indication as to how it sees Brexit affecting UK energy 
policy.  However, the key issues are likely to arise in the following areas. 
Market Structures 
There is unlikely to be much change in the short term in relation to energy market structures.  
Regulatory rules, even where derived from EU law, are mostly contained in domestic primary or 
secondary legislation, and where they are not they can relatively unproblematically be given a 
domestic legal base via the Great Repeal Bill.  In the longer term, Brexit will in theory allow greater 
freedom to reform energy markets.  This might encompass detailed aspects of energy regulation, for 
instance in relation to the scope and content of consumer protection obligations, the technical 
requirements on networks and providers, or the duties of energy regulators.  More fundamentally, it 
could also relate to the structure of the energy industries, for example, allowing more direct 
governmental involvement in energy decision-making, a stronger emphasis on energy planning rather 
than market-driven investment, a reintegration of energy networks with producers and suppliers, or 
restrictions on foreign ownership.  In practice, alongside ongoing ideological commitments to free 
energy markets, the room for manoeuvre is likely to be significantly constrained by whatever 
relationship the UK has in future with the Internal Energy Market (IEM). 
Market Integration 
As a net importer of both gas and electricity, maintaining access to European energy markets is 
essential from a security of supply point of view.  In addition, transparent and properly integrated 
energy markets improve energy affordability by increasing the efficient use of existing energy facilities 
and thereby reducing investment costs, as well as by removing opportunities for arbitrage.  Finally, 
integration is also an important means of managing the potential balancing problems caused by 
intermittent renewable energy sources.  This is particularly important for the Scottish Government, 
which has high ambitions as a producer and exporter of renewable energy.   
The UK has significantly increased its interconnection with other European gas and electricity systems 
in recent years, and more interconnection capacity is planned.  It has also played a leading role in the 
development of European Network Codes to facilitate genuine system integration, and not merely 
inter-system trade.  Integration is particularly advanced in Northern Ireland, where there has been a 
single All-Ireland electricity wholesale market since 2007, and where work to create an All-Ireland 
wholesale gas market is ongoing. 
In its Brexit White Paper (Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017: para 8.28), the UK 
Government recognises the value of co-ordinated trading arrangements, buƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƐŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚ “ ?ǁ ?Ğ
ĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĂůůĨƵƚƵƌĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŽŶĞŶĞƌŐǇ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?
to avoid disruption to the all-Ireland single electricity market ... on which both Northern Ireland and 
Ireland rely for afĨŽƌĚĂďůĞ ? ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ? ? KƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ
participation in the IEM include membership of the European Economic Area, which the UK 
Government has already ruled out, or some kind of bespoke agreement along the lines of the Energy 
Community Treaty, which extends the IEM into non-EU Member States in South-East Europe and 
beyond.  Alternatively the UK might seek access to European energy markets without being part of 
the IEM as such. 
dŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐ ?ŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚůŝŵĂƚĞŚĂŶŐĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶKĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚŶŽŶĞ
of the respondents to its inquiry into the implications of Brexit for energy and climate change policy 
had advocated leaving the IEM (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2016: para 95).  It did, 
however, note considerable concern that the UK might remain subject to IEM rules while losing its 
current influential position in the making of those rules (ibid: para 97).  It therefore recommended 
that the Government should seek to ensure a continued role for the UK in European energy regulatory 
bodies (ibid: para 103). 
Low Carbon Energy 
The energy industries are subject to a range of EU measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.  These include the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), targets and measures to 
promote renewable energy consumption, and targets and measures to promote energy efficiency, 
although these are all supplemented by domestic policy measures.  
It is unclear whether the UK will seek to remain within the EU-ETS after Brexit, or establish its own 
emissions trading scheme linked to the EU-ETS, or pursue a different approach to establishing a price 
for carbon, such as a carbon tax.  The Energy and Climate Change Committee noted that, despite 
criticism of the EU-ETS, it is highly valued as a policy instrument for reducing GHG emissions, and 
warned that alternative measures would potentially costly and complex or politically difficult (Energy 
and Climate Change Committee, 2016: para 84).   
In relation to renewable energy and energy efficiency, we are likely to see continuity at least in the 
short term in relation to specific policy measures, many of which have already been incorporated into 
domestic law.  It is, however, unlikely that EU-level targets will be replicated at domestic level as the 
UK Government has in the past been critical of the distorting effects of sectoral targets, preferring to 
rely on overall climate change targets to drive emissions reduction.  Given that the Conservative 
Government has already reversed some domestic policy supports for low carbon energy (including 
withdrawal or cuts to subsidies for renewable electricity generation, cancellation of funding for carbon 
capture and storage demonstration projects, and ending some energy efficiency programmes) in order 
to reduce energy costs, and is keen to promote shale gas exploitation, there must be considerable 
concern about the future direction of policy in this area post-Brexit. 
Other Environmental Constraints 
A host of other EU environmental laws also affect the energy industries, including atmospheric and 
water pollution controls; nature protection measures; and environmental impact assessment 
regulations.  The impact of such measures can be considerable.  It was, for instance, the Large 
Combustion Plants Directives of 1998 and 2001 (now replaced by the 2010 Industrial Emissions 
Directive) that were primarily responsible for the decline of the coal-fired electricity generation in the 
UK.  The Habitats and Wild Birds Directives similarly often pose obstacles to the exploitation of 
renewable generation.   
The majority of relevant EU environmental measures are already implemented in domestic law and 
will therefore be unaffected by Brexit.  In the short term, there is unlikely to be much appetite for 
significant change in the environmental regulatory framework, given the other policy uncertainty 
caused by Brexit.  In any case, some EU environmental laws are underpinned by international 
obligations, and in domestic terms much environmental law making falls within devolved competence 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  Over time, however, there may be pressure from the energy 
industries to weaken environmental constraints, and there may be concerns about policy divergence 
between the UK and devolved governments.  
Research and Investment Funding 
Research and investment funding is likely to be both directly and indirectly affected by Brexit.  
Regarding the former, there are various EU funding sources for energy-related research and 
investment in energy infrastructure from which the UK has received very substantial sums in recent 
years.  It is unclear whether British researchers and UK-based firms will be able to continue to access 
those funding sources after Brexit, or if not, whether they will be fully replaced by domestic funding 
sources (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2016: paras 118  ? 121).   
More generally, Brexit is likely to make for a worse investment climate.  Increased policy uncertainty 
is likely to raise the cost of capital for energy infrastructure; the falling pound has also made 
investment more expensive since much energy equipment is imported; and adverse impacts on the 
financial services sector could reduce the appetite for investment.  The Energy and Climate Change 
Committee concluded in its October 2016 report that the greatest risk of leaving the IEM was higher 
investment costs, and that the Leave vote had reduced already weak investor confidence in the energy 
sector (ibid: paras 96 and 122  ? 133). 
Nuclear Safety 
The UK Government has made clear in its Brexit White Paper that leaving the EU also means leaving 
Euratom (Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017: para 8.30).  The Euratom treaty provides 
the current framework for civil nuclear power generation and radioactive waste management.  
Leaving Euratom has raised some alarm about potentially dire consequences for the nuclear industry 
if alternative regulatory arrangements are not put in place in time (see eg Vaughan, 2017).  However, 
the UK Government insists that seeking appropriate alternative arrangements, as well as maintaining 
collaboration with other EU Member States on nuclear research, is a high priority for the withdrawal 
negotiations (Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017: para 8.31).  Potentially, this could 
involve continued participation in Euratom as a non-EU Member State, through a separate treaty, as 
a number of third parties already do (see Peers, 2017). 
Conclusion 
/ŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƌĞǆŝƚǁŝůůďƌŝŶŐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨƵƚƵƌĞh<ĞŶĞƌŐǇƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
perspective, potential changes may be desirable or undesirable.  In practice, given the convergence 
between UK and EU energy policy goals, and the clear advantages of continued participation in 
European energy and related markets, the scope for change in UK energy policy is likely to be fairly 
marginal.  That being so, it is hard to see Brexit as anything other than an unwelcome distraction at a 
time when the energy industries are already in a state of transition and facing very significant 
regulatory and investment challenges.  
References 
Department for Exiting the European Union (2017), dŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ <ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?Ɛ ǆŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶĚ EĞǁ
Relationship With the European Union, Cm 9417 
Energy and Climate Change Committee (2016), The Energy Revolution and Future Challenges for UK 
Energy and Climate Change Policy, 3rd Report 2016  ? 17, HC 705 
^ WĞĞƌƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  “dŚĞ h< ƌĞǆŝƚƐ ƵƌĂƚŽŵ P >ĞŐĂů &ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ &ƵƚƵƌĞ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?EU Law 
Analysis Blog, 30 January 2017 
sĂƵŐŚĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “h<EƵĐůĞĂƌWŽǁĞƌ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ŽƵůĚďĞ&ŽƌĐĞĚ ƚŽůŽƐĞ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƌĞǆŝƚ ? ?The Guardian, 
28 February 2017 
Biography 
Aileen McHarg is Professor of Public Law at the University of Strathclyde.  She has written extensively 
on energy regulation at EU, UK and Scottish levels.  She is a member and former chair of the Academic 
ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ'ƌŽƵƉƚŽƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶŶĞƌŐǇ ?ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚ
Infrastructure Law. 
 
